Ukraine one year on: some random observations
The first anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine is upon us and the print, digital and broadcast media is taking stock. This article will not add to that canon. It will make no attempt at an audit of war; rather, it will simply pick out three themes with little to connect them beyond the context of the war in Ukraine. None of the themes is central to most of the current debate, but my best guess is that they might become increasingly influential in the year ahead, and beyond.
Observation one: History repeating itself
The character of war changes as new weapons, techniques and tactics come into play, but the nature of war, as the contest of political wills mediated by military violence, remains eternal. So maybe it’s no surprise that we might feel we’ve been here before. A war that started with an over-ambitious grab for the enemy’s capital city, followed by a brief period of movement, before settling down to protracted attrition, is about where we are today in Ukraine.
The aggressor is occupying the most advantageous position in war by being on the strategic offensive (by the occupation of enemy territory) and the tactical defensive (by inviting the enemy to win his territory back). But recognising local tactical vulnerability, particularly around Kherson, he has withdrawn to a naturally defensible line while he mobilises mass reserves and puts his economy on a war footing. All with the intention of delivering a knockout blow with a decisive Spring offensive.
For February 2023, read February 1918. The long slog of 1914-17 has been compressed into a single year, but the situation now is remarkably and improbably similar to the beginning of the end of the First World War. Germany (for which read Russia) held the strategic initiative and had consolidated defensively on the Hindenburg Line, while massing men and materiel for the decisive, war conclusive stroke. The Allies (for which read Ukraine) knew the offensive was coming and – spread thin — also knew they were likely to be overwhelmed by local concentrations of force.
The Kaiserschlacht (Kaiser’s battle) commenced on the morning of 21 March 1918, which became the bloodiest single day of the war. The intense combat that followed saw the Germans make dramatic tactical gains and, as the crisis of the battle approached, the notoriously emotionally monotone British commander, Douglas Haig, issued a Special Order of the Day on 11 April which even the telegenic Volodymyr Zelenskyy might be pushed to improve upon: “With our backs to the wall and believing in the justice of our cause each one of us must fight on to the end…”
The German offensive eventually spent its force and – just as informed commentary expects the re-armed Ukrainians to do – the Allies mounted a counter-offensive. The dam burst on 8 August at the Battle of Amiens (in Ludendorff’s doleful phrase, “the Black Day of the German army”) and opened the way to the defeat of Wilhelmine Germany (for which read Putin’s Russia). Whether either side can find its Amiens Moment might decide 2023, and the war.
Observation two: We live in an echo chamber too
In the West, the standard accusation is that Vladimir Putin lives in an echo chamber, where he only receives the sycophantic but self-interested advice of his intimate circle, an assorted crew of kleptocrats and war criminals. In contrast, NATO is open and solid (notwithstanding German economic self-interest masquerading as penitence for the sins of the 20th century and a French sulk as the European strategic centre of gravity moves East) and confident in the legitimacy of a Just War. Unfortunately, just about nobody else shares that view.
For much of the Global South this is private European grief and little to do with them. This view is assiduously cultivated by the persistent diplomacy of Sergei Lavrov and the smart and pervasive Russian communications campaign, against which Western attempts to shape global opinion pale in comparison. As much of the Middle East and South/Central Asia hedges its bets and wrings cut-price energy deals out of Russia, so a substantial part of Sub-Saharan Africa sees the legacy of colonialism in the behaviour of the West. Latin America, meanwhile, has more pressing domestic concerns.
Convinced of our own strategic rectitude – alternatively stated, occupying our own echo chamber — we indulge in the fantasy that world opinion is with us, when it’s not. And it matters because if, as Joe Biden assures us, we are embarked on a Manichaean struggle between alternative Democratic and Autocratic world systems, the swing vote lies in the Global South, and we need to be clear sighted about how we win that.
Observation three: What is it?
As part of this week’s exchange of presidential rhetoric, Joe Biden reassured Ukrainians that America and the West were with them for “as long as it takes”. That’s great, but what is the it that he’s committing to? The West has armed Ukraine well enough to avoid defeat, but not yet well enough to facilitate victory; on current form, Ukraine will find its Amiens Moment elusive. In turn, that looks like a recipe for a long, drawn-out conflict that is likely to end with mutual exhaustion – until both sides reconstitute and start round two. Lest we forget, what started in 1914 ended in 1945, not 1918.
The dilemma is perfectly illustrated by the conduct of Western debate, which is all about how many Leopard tanks to ship or how much F-16 training to provide. This is a debate about the means of strategy and not the ends. It turns the process of conventional strategic analysis on its head. A coherent strategy must proceed with a definition of the desired outcome (the ends, or Joe Biden’s it) from which is then derived the means and ways to achieve it. This comes with its own dangers: ends that prescribe the defeat of Russia and its eviction from Ukrainian sovereign territory carry a clear risk of escalation. But at least that is a sentient strategic choice rather than just hoping for the best, which is what flogging the means without defining the ends amounts to.
There’s no attempt to join the dots here; three pretty random observations do not a comprehensive analysis make. These factors may, though, either independently or in some as yet unseen conjunction, shape the war in Ukraine and its strategic legacy.
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