Peacekeeping in Ukraine: beware the breach

The idea of European nations deploying a multinational force in Ukraine (peacekeepers, we like to think they would be) ebbed and flowed last year. But this week, it is back with the news that Britain and France have “formally committed ” to deploying troops in Ukraine in the event of a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia. Though the extent of President Putin’s acquiescence is unclear, the peace deal currently being shaped is based on a 20 point plan, whittled down from a previous 28. That said, the fate of the territory of eastern Ukraine, the Donbas, is likely to continue being a serious obstacle. A formal and clear Russian response is now awaited.

A Paris summit of the 35-nation “coalition of the willing ” (a phrase surprisingly unretired) held this week also confirmed that President Trump supports the security protocols being drawn up, which is a positive development. However, in the admirable effort to help, Britain and France would do well to recall that the truism about first needing a peace to keep is generally something honoured in the breach.

Though any multinational force presently being discussed is predicated on an understanding that there would be a peace deal in place, peace deals are generally only the first day of a very long journey – departure point, not destination – in which all options remain possible, not least lapse back into conflict. The theory of peacekeeping is solid enough; present a force large enough to provide deterrence to avoid further bloodshed, or interposition between formerly warring sides who are adjusting and demilitarising to meet a newly and mutually agreed reality of peace.

Generally speaking, there is consensus on the primacy in peace operations of three principles: the need for consent of the host government and/or the parties involved, impartiality, and the minimum use of force only in self-defence. Consent is essential because it gives a mission the ability, politically and physically, to move around in the place it is deployed, and in this case, that would only be on Ukrainian soil. Ukraine consents to the peacekeeping force, mostly because it sees them as allies in its fight, not impartial arbiters. Russia has said no to peacekeepers, and would not view European forces as impartial. Thus, without consent or impartiality, two of the three principles would be absent.

Next, the “peace” in “peacekeeper” needs unpacking a little. At one end of the spectrum, peacekeepers can act like cogs in logistical chains, as they bring with them equipment and transport to help deliver their mandates (which often can have a strong humanitarian element), and that is frequently a very practical exercise of moving troops and materiel from A to B. Training of the Ukraine army is intended to be a core component of any British deployment there. At the other end of the spectrum, however, peacekeepers are another force in the conflict, altering the dynamic, no matter how impartial they try to be. 

European leaders may fervently hope that the authority of a multinational force will be purely symbolic, but it is simply impossible to deploy thousands of armed troops and it be seen as benign, especially such interested ones as British. In Ukraine, the history of the UK is well known. It is not a belligerent, but makes no bones about which side it supports and supplies. One suspects that to the Russian prosecutors of the war, placing British or other European troops in harm’s way for a spot of deniable needling would be interesting and manipulable opportunity.

It is a truism often repeated: you also need a peace to keep. For peacekeepers to deploy into a suitable environment, there should be a peace deal well supported and bought into by both sides. That this will be achieved is still not clear, with the future of the Donbas a red line issue for both sides. Peace deals lacking the proper support and with reservations are a risk, as it creates cracks into which backsliding and resistance on the ground to it immediately pour.

In these conditions, peacekeepers would be operating in a territory without real peace, a situation that could easily escalate. In fact, most important to consider is provocation, escalation, and the circumstances in which a peacekeeper would invoke self-defence. Furthermore, the success of peacekeeping depends in large part on the political process which lies beneath it. The content of a peace deal is generally about future engagement, not definitive resolution of past engagement, meaning that the intentions of the warring parties towards the future matters a lot. Again, this is unclear.

Looking back at UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina) in the early 1990s makes for an interesting lesson. In February 1992, UNPROFOR was authorised by the UN Security Council to provide a secure environment so that the fighting in the Balkans could come to a negotiated settlement. At its maximum, UNPROFOR’s strength reached around 45,000 personnel, with an annual budget of just under $2 billion. The Bosnian capital of Sarajevo was still under siege, and part of UNPROFOR’s tasks was to keep the city working, as well as to monitor a no-fly zone (but which was enforced by NATO). The establishment of safe areas, zones in which civilians might escape the fighting under UNPROFOR’s protection, recast the force less as neutral and more as enforcers, a perception enhanced by its authorisation to “deter attacks ” . This drew it further and further into the orbit of warfighting, but without the express mandate or equipment to do it. Furthermore, troop – contributing countries were loath to put ground troops in harm’s way.

Troop numbers and concentrations were sufficient that they might conceivably “deter” attacks, but not “defend” against them, and UNPROFOR’s opponents could take advantage of its shackled posture. In May 1995, for example, Bosnian Serb forces took nearly 400 peacekeepers hostage, deploying them strategically to deter airstrikes against Serb positions, bringing into sharp relief the vulnerability and impotence of the peacekeepers. Though there is no suggestion in today’s case that any peacekeepers would come into direct contact with Russian forces, ways will no doubt present themselves of highlighting their vulnerability and relative impotence the closer they get to eastern Ukraine. What would be the response to, say, the capture by Russia of a European peacekeeper while conducting his or her duties, is a very serious question to ask in advance.

The sentiment behind the suggestion of peacekeepers as part of a multinational force is defensible, but before it can go further, a real and consensual peace deal is needed, followed by a careful, practical and Ukraine-specific examination of the principles of consent, impartiality, and the minimum use of force only in self-defence. Until then, there isn’t a peace solid enough to keep. While “peacekeeping” sounds like a soothing ointment for these troubled times, the deployment of a multinational force to Ukraine is a very risky business. Beware the breach.

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