How the war in Ukraine might end

One of the most prescient predictions about the end of a war made just after its start has to be the one found on the discardable-when-bound outer cover of the September 23 1939 edition of the news aggregation periodical The War Illustrated. It editor, Sir John Hammerton, suggested that, at war’s end, the “Hitler Gang” would all end up on the end of a noose or facing a firing squad. It is never too soon after a conflict has started to predict the fate of its instigators.

By now, it is clear that Russia’s only chance of prevailing in the illegal Ukraine War she started is the make the lives of Ukrainians so wretched that there is an internal coup against Zelensky to halt the missile attacks and ask for terms. Russia is still demanding that the international community accept her diminished territorial gains as a prelude for any discussion. That will not happen.

Russia’s current ground strategy seems to be to shovel poorly-trained and -equipped conscripts towards Ukrainian front lines, wait for them to get shot or bombarded to death and then use artillery to attack the newly-exposed positions, advance to take them, and then repeat. It is the ‘bite-and-hold’ method that is used to surmount static lines of defence, a gradualist approach that is effective, but at significant human cost. The strategy only prevails if the soldiers feel valued in their work, otherwise mutinies can take hold. There are numerous reports of small-scale out-of-theatre mutinies taking place in the ranks, and these are widely publicised as they have been recorded and shared using smartphones. A major revolt on the front lines would spell disaster for Russia, as it did in 1917.

While how the war will end remains in doubt, there is no doubt the war will end. It will most likely end with a Ukrainian victory. For Russia to concede, Putin will have to be deposed or die in office of natural causes or otherwise. Putin’s deposition will only take place when those who support him at present determine that their interests lie in his removal, and that this removal would not herald a political revolution that would also sweep them away. Finding this sweet spot may be the only thing capable of stopping the fighting.

There is the complication that the men who would topple Putin may be just as implicated as he is in war crimes, unless they were amnestied as part of a peace deal. Alternatively, a power-base of sanctioned oligarchs could be encouraged to develop, the trade-off being a withdrawal of sanctions if they managed to find a way to replace Putin, or more likely persuade Putin’s praetorian guard to do so.

So what would the post-war region look like? The constituent parts of the Russian Federation may come under stress to fission as Moscow’s writ had been shown to be damaged. New countries may emerge, but their international recognition would be a matter for debate. Other countries with unruly regions may hesitate to support breakaways for fear of accusations of hypocrisy. There may even be a second Russian Civil War, quite dangerous for a country with a large nuclear arsenal. It depends on how seriously the Russian internal security forces fragment.

For Ukraine, there will be massive international investment in rebuilding contracts. Britain and America, Ukraine’s most significant supporters, may get good business there, although Poland would share in this peace dividend as well. The foreign and military policy of Ukraine would undergo a profound shift as well. The Ukrainian government may initiate a development programme into precision-guided long-range missiles and develop an arsenal of them, all pointed at the Russian Federation or its successor states.

Should a Russian dictator ever again dare to make a move against Kyiv, then Russian citizens would quickly find themselves without water or power, as Ukrainian missiles attacked civilian infrastructure as well as military concentrations. Ukrainian special forces and activated sleeper units would also operate on Russian soil, attacking choke-points in Russian military supply and communications. Russian warplanes may also be downed on Russian soil by missile-armed units near Russian airbases. It is likely that the threat of such a unit caused the cancellation of the flypast at this year’s Victory parade in Moscow. Had a MiG-29 been shot down over the Kremlin in front of a television audience of millions of Russians, the damage to Putin’s credibility would have been immeasurable.

Ukraine could not rely on any peace treaty with Russia unless there were Western guarantors and part of that guarantee would have to involve the stationing of Western forces on Ukrainian soil. NATO could be invited into Ukraine as part of any guarantee of Ukrainian independence, or Ukraine would henceforward conduct joint military exercises with NATO forces. Russia would have realised the nightmare she was trying to avoid with this war.

The situation of Lukashenko, the dictator of Belarus, would become highly precarious. Dictatorships are inherently corrupt, and their players only support the incumbent if it is convenient, safe, or profitable. Lukashenko’s part in the war has been almost, but not quite, like that of Mussolini to Hitler, in backing what he thought to be an undisputed winner in a conflict. By allowing his country to be used as a springboard for Russian forces to attack the Ukrainian capital, his removal is surely part of any post-war Ukrainian foreign policy, as would be his replacement by a pro-Ukrainian leader.

Already, Lukashenko’s previously healthy foreign minister has died in mysterious circumstances after a meeting in Moscow, suggested to be a Russian poisoning, perhaps because the Russians did not like what they were hearing from him. Lukashenko may have been sent a strong message not to jump ship, but his time at the top is surely coming to a close after his career-defining blunder of backing the wrong horse. It may only be a question of which country would offer him a bolt-hole. Idi Amin managed to spend his final years sunning it in Jeddah, and if Saudi Arabia offered their services again, Lukashenko may take the opportunity to enjoy a less hot reception in the desert than if he stayed in his chillier native climate.

The fate of the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad may also be open to question. Any dissolution of the Russian Federation may invite an alteration of its status. It made sense for Russia to hold on to this former German territory when it was contiguous to the USSR through the illegally-annexed Baltic states, but since their independence on the collapse of the USSR, this is open to question. Evacuated by Germany in the closing stages of the Second World War, Kaliningrad is in effect a Russian colony, and a territorial revision and population transfer might increasingly be a matter for discussion, especially since the enclave is surrounded by now-unfriendly countries that would rather the Russian military bases Kaliningrad hosts were gone. A compromise might be to have the enclave administered by another country while still nominally being part of the Russian Federation. This throwback to the defeat of Nazi Germany requires revision, as it remains one of the few territorial legacies unresolved since German reunification.

The Ukrainian War is part of the death-throes of the Russian Empire, a death that started in 1905, accelerated in 1917, reversed in 1922, seemed inconceivable in 1945, and resumed in 1990-91. Rather like the after-effects of the fall of the Ottoman Empire, it is a defining event in global history. Russian decline comes in fits and starts, but today seems unavoidable. It is to be hoped that future stages are less eventful, but history does suggest otherwise.

A Message from TheArticle

We are the only publication that’s committed to covering every angle. We have an important contribution to make, one that’s needed now more than ever, and we need your help to continue publishing throughout these hard economic times. So please, make a donation.