The death of 33 Turkish soldiers in Syria risks dragging Nato into war with Russia

The death of 33 Turkish soldiers and wounding of another 30 in Idlib overnight, possibly at the hands of Russian warplanes, shows the dangerous brinkmanship between Russia and Turkey in Syria. Once again Turkey has become Nato’s most vulnerable flank, opening up the dangerous possibility of escalation in a regional conflict from which the rest of the alliance has tried to distance itself.

This week’s events show the extent to which Turkey now finds itself isolated on the international stage and, as a result, prone to ever more extreme measures to secure its vital interests. Despite this political isolation, the ever-present risk is that Turkey finds itself drawn into direct conflict with Russia. For Nato, the vulnerability is Turkey then invoking Nato’s mutual defence clause — Article 5, which demands that Turkey’s Nato allies come to her military defence.

While the risk of this is currently relatively low, it clearly illustrates the risk of one bellicose Nato member dragging the others into a conflict in which most members have studiously sought to minimise direct involvement. Unintended military escalation in Syria is far removed from Nato’s core project of territorial defence. Would the other allies be prepared to rush to Turkey’s defence, in a conflict where they disapprove of her involvement in the first place? It seems unlikely. The existence of such existential questions weakens Nato by underscoring the political and strategic fragility of Article 5. Unsurprisingly, Nato has responded by calling an emergency meeting.

Ankara has been quick to suggest that the fatal strike was caused by Syrian government forces rather than Russia, even though Russian jets have been delivering the majority of airstrikes in the region in recent weeks. While the Turkish government has avoided directly blaming Russia, in order to avoid escalation, in Ankara on Friday protestors gathered outside the Russian embassy shouting “Murderer Russia! Murderer Putin!”

Turkey has long supported the opposition during Syria’s nine-year civil war, finding herself in opposition to Russia and Iran who have largely been successful in helping Bashar al-Assad defeat his opponents. President Erdogan’s foreign policy has been shaped by the high-risk strategy of playing off the US, Europe, much of the Arab world and Russia against each other, so far with very little success for Turkey. His decision to purchase the S-400 air defence system from Russia resulted in Turkey’s expulsion from the F-35 fighter jet programme last year.

In the wake of last night’s casualties it is hard to see what benefits this has secured from Russia. In reality, Ankara’s relationship with Moscow in the Syrian war has been marked by a catalogue of military miscalculations that have, on multiple occasions, only narrowly avoided escalation. Probably the most serious of these was the shooting down of a Russian Su-24 jet in November 2015 by the Turkish Air Force after an alleged violation of Turkish Air Space. One of the two Russian pilots was killed after successfully ejecting. None other than the late Iranian General Qasem Soleimani masterminded the rescue of the second pilot, after an initial Russian rescue operation resulted in the loss of a helicopter and the death of Russian soldier.

Nonetheless only four months ago, just as Erdogan launched “Operation Peace Spring” against the US-supported YPG in north-eastern Syria, the Turkish foreign minister declared the “strategic ties” with Russia were “unshakeable”. Turkey had hoped that this relationship would counterbalance her deteriorating relationship with the West, especially the United States, with whose special forces it was feared there might be a military clash in Syria.

Commentators on Nato often compare Turkey’s membership of the alliance to Salazar’s Portugal during the Cold War. Their suggestion is that Nato can withstand the membership of non-democratic countries. The problem with Erdogan’s Turkey is not just the slide away from Western democracy. The vacillation between Nato and Russia, part of an increasingly unpredictable Turkish foreign policy, is a threat to the strategic coherence of Nato. Erdogan’s purchase of the S-400 air defence system was more an act of defiance of the West than based on a coherent military rationale.

Only four months since Ankara was potentially facing off against the US in Syria, the tables have turned again and Erdogan is now requesting that the US deploy Patriot missiles against the Russo-Syrian threat and that Nato enforces a no-fly zone in Idlib. Unsurprisingly, both the US and Nato remained unwilling to become further embroiled in the conflict or to risk directly or indirectly engaging Russia.

The goal of the Western allies must be to seek de-escalation, not least to avoid the triggering of Nato mutual defence obligations. Senator Marco Rubio tweeted on Thursday night that “The prospects of a direct military confrontation between Turkey and Russia in Syria are very high and increasing by the hour.”

His words are not just hyperbole and were followed by Kay Bailey Hutchinson, US ambassador to Nato saying that, “This is a big development . . . We want Turkey to understand that we are the ones they’ve been allied with.” As tensions increased, two Russian warships carrying Kalibr cruise missiles sailed through the Dardanelles for a planned deployment off Syria.

The danger is that with little chance of US or European military reengagement in Syria, both Erdogan and his Nato allies are running out of options for preventing escalation. The irony is that Article 5, as a last resort for Erdogan may prove to be the greatest threat to Nato’s peace.