The lesson of Ukraine? If we give Zelensky the tools, he will finish the job
What have we learned from the war in Ukraine so far? All the experts agree that the Russian invasion has not gone according to plan. What was meant to be a classic Blitzkrieg has morphed into siege warfare, with multiple population centres now being pounded with increasingly deadly (and in many cases illegal) munitions. The initial assault, using fast-moving light armoured units, failed to take Kyiv, Kharkiv, Mariupol and other strategic targets. Ukrainian claims that 4,500 Russian troops have been killed, while hundreds more have been taken prisoner, are credible. However, it is likely that Ukrainian military casualties are of a similar order of magnitude and the civilian death toll in the thousands rather than the hundreds so far admitted.
Meanwhile Wagner Group mercenaries (mostly Spetsnaz and other special forces veterans) operating behind Ukrainian lines have so far failed to decapitate the leadership in Kyiv. According to one unverified report, an entire formation of Chechens sent to kill or capture President Zelensky was wiped out by drone and missile strikes, with the loss of 56 tanks and many hundreds of men, including their notorious commander, General Tushayev. If correct, this is a stunning blow to Putin’s Chechen satrap, Ramzan Kadyrov, who was filmed rallying his troops shortly before their abortive mission. During the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, Chechen death squads operated with Ossetian separatists in carrying out ethnic cleansing against Georgian civilians.
Putin’s war of movement having run out of steam, he is now sending in large reserves of heavy armour, artillery and infantry to reduce Kyiv to rubble. The formation seen by satellites approaching the capital overnight was 40 miles long, in some places several vehicles abreast. This implies a tank army numbering tens of thousands of troops. Such a show of force suggests that Putin has ordered his generals to capture Kyiv at all costs, in the hope that this will break Ukrainian resistance. A rapid conquest is all-important, in the hope that he can present an unexpectedly hostile and united world with a fait accompli.
Once again, exposing such large columns to airborne attack is a high-risk move. Safety is being sacrificed for speed. Just as in 2008, when they sent similar columns through the mountain passes of the Caucasus, confident that their opponents would be incapable of interception, the Russians are gambling on the likelihood that, after nearly a week of intensive combat, Ukrainian forces are running short of missiles, aircraft and lethal drones. Zelensky’s now immortal retort to Biden’s offer of evacuation, “I need ammunition, not a ride”, points to his greatest weakness: supply lines. Without huge quantities of modern equipment and ammunition, no amount of courage can prevail against such heavy odds.
What could redress the balance would be for what Roosevelt called “the arsenal of democracy” to start resupplying Ukraine with the wherewithal to defend itself. Nowadays, that means not just the United States but also Britain, France and, crucially, Germany. Despite their pacifist rhetoric, the Germans are actually Europe’s biggest arms manufacturers. Last year Germany’s arms exports were twice as large as the UK’s (about £7.5 billion compared to £3.5 billion).
Not a single German bullet went to Ukraine, although substantial quantities of dual-use equipment were sold to Russia. This is why it mattered so much that in the weeks before the invasion, Berlin refused to allow German weaponry to be sent to Ukraine by third parties — not even old East German artillery offered by Estonia. Sunday’s U-turn by Chancellor Scholz, who has finally come off the fence to offer at least verbal support for Ukraine, may be too little, too late unless the Germans are prepared to risk the ire of the Kremlin to match their words with action.
Ammunition depots have been among the Russians’ priority targets and their control of Ukrainian airspace means that the defenders of Kyiv and Kharkiv cannot now be supplied by air. The huge exodus of refugees — half a million already, with predictions of up to seven million to come — means that roads and border crossings into Poland are clogged. In any case, transport of military supplies by land is vulnerable to Russian drones and helicopter gunships. The West has no choice but to use clandestine routes for arms and munitions, which will inevitably take longer to reach Kyiv and other besieged cities to the south and east. It is unlikely that NATO is organising such covert supply lines, for fear of antagonising Putin.
As we know, Liz Truss touched a raw nerve when she defended the right of British and other foreign volunteers to fight for Ukraine. Putin’s response to these “unacceptable threats” was to place his nuclear deterrent on “combat duty”. Russian President’s spokesman issued this unintentionally comical rebuke: “I will not name the author of these statements but it was the British Foreign Secretary.”
We now learn that at least 150 former British paratroopers had signed up for this Ukrainian foreign legion, reminiscent of the International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War. It is rich of Putin to complain about such volunteers, given the bloody trail left by his private army, the aforementioned Wagner Group, across Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere. But Ben Wallace, the Defence Secretary, quickly contradicted Ms Truss and, despite rumours to the contrary, it is safe to assume that HM Government is not baiting the Russian bear by sending special forces to Ukraine.
All the same, the Prime Minister has not slapped his Foreign Secretary down. She speaks for him when she says that Putin “is violating human rights on an industrial scale” and calls on the international community to punish the war criminals in the Kremlin. Today the PM flies to Poland and Estonia, as close to the war zone as possible, to see first hand what are the best ways of helping Zelensky and his band of brothers to keep going. Between them, Liz and Boris have set an example of leadership for the West.
The Russian Army is not invincible. In essentials, its military doctrine does not seem to have advanced much beyond that of the Great Patriotic War, as Russians call World War II. In his recent, highly controversial book, Stalin’s War, the historian Sean McMeekin debunks some of the myths that still surround the titanic struggle on the Eastern Front that ultimately broke the Wehrmacht. McMeekin shows how Hitler smashed Stalin’s war machine, only to be stymied by the huge Allied effort to supply the Red Army with vital equipment. Aided by his spies and fellow travellers in Washington and London, Stalin was repeatedly saved by Roosevelt and Churchill, whose unconditional support turned the crusade for democracy into “Stalin’s war”.
It is in his military analysis, however, that McMeekin is most persuasive. He shows how even historians until recently swallowed Soviet propaganda about the major battles on the Easten Front. One example must suffice here. The Battle of Kursk in July 1943 is seen as Hitler’s last throw of the dice, a victory for the Red Army even more decisive than the more celebrated Battles of Stalingrad or Moscow. Kursk, which took place not far from the present war in Ukraine, is also beloved of armchair generals as “the greatest tank battle of all time”.
But McMeekin tells a different story. Operation Citadel, as the Germans called it, was actually a remarkable achievement by Erich von Manstein, the brilliant German commander. Though outnumbered and lacking surprise, the German panzer divisions with their brand new Panther and Tiger tanks completely outfought the well-prepared Soviet forces under Marshal Zhukov and were on the point of victory when Hitler suddenly called off the offensive. The Anglo-American landings in Sicily had spooked him and he ordered Manstein to transfer several of his best units to Italy.
“Hitler’s halting of Operation Citadel to counter the Allied move into Sicily was the greatest possible gift to Stalin,” McMeekin comments. By the end of the Kursk campaign, Soviet losses are estimated at between 863,303 (low end) and 1,677,000 (high end), compared to German losses of 170,000. Losses of tanks, planes and other equipment were similarly at least eight to one in favour of the Germans. In the climactic clash of armour at Prokhorovka, the Russians claimed to have destroyed 700 Tigers — but the German force actually only had 15 of them. Yet Kursk has been mythologised as a victory not only for Russian courage and resilience (which it was) but also for Russian technology and leadership (which it was not).
The Soviet tactics of hurling huge numbers of men and tanks at their enemies, regardless of losses, are still being employed in Ukraine today. Yet the Russia of 2022 is not the Soviet Union of 1943. Putin cannot afford to take vast casualties, as Stalin could, nor does he have the West on his side, as Stalin did. This is a war that Russia cannot sustain, neither economically nor politically. Time was always on Stalin’s side; Putin must win quickly or not at all.
Above all, this time Zelensky is fighting a great patriotic war against a tyrannical, criminal and potentially genocidal enemy who wishes to reduce Ukraine first to a satellite and ultimately to a province of Russia. Putin cannot afford to lose this war, but this time he has met his match. If NATO can give Zelensky the tools, he will finish the job.
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