Belarus exposes Nato's deep vulnerabilities

The end of Summer has historically been an exceptionally bad time for Russia analysts to go on holiday, as the Kremlin has past form in springing an “August surprise”. Take for instance the 2008 Georgian War, or Putin’s recent Covid-19 vaccine announcement. The worry is that with America and her European allies absorbed with Covid-19 and its economic consequences, we may be about to witness another “August Surprise” in Belarus.

Although only recently making its way into Western headlines, Belarus slid into chaos following last week’s elections and the brutal repression of widespread protests that followed. The country’s destabilisation actually poses an acute strategic threat at the heart of Nato. It potentially ushers in yet another episode in Russia’s rewriting of the balance of power on Nato’s border, which has gathered pace over the past 12 years. A week after the elections, as tens of thousands of Belarusians gathered in Minsk to protest, Vladamir Putin told the longstanding president Aleksandr Lukashenko that Moscow was ready to support him, via a collective military pact if necessary.

Belarus’s fate poses a military problem that is far from being answered. A successful Russian power play there, if it occurs, would require a major strategic rethink for Nato and would be far more damaging than the Ukraine invasion of 2014.

Belarus matters a great deal to Putin. The country sits to the west of Russia and just 40 miles from the historically significant Russian outpost of Kaliningrad. The narrow, strategically significant stretch of land separating the two Russian territories is known as the “Suwalki Gap”. If Russia is able to control and effectively close this space, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia would be severed from the rest of Nato, without a shot being fired. In so doing Nato’s assurance of mutual security becomes all but impossible to maintain.

In strategic terms, as one influential planning document noted in 2018, “Belarus is fully integrated into Russia’s armed forces, even if its military is not part of Russia’s Western Military District — an area that encompasses Kaliningrad and a vast stretch of territory from Karelia along the Finnish border to eastern Ukraine… The Belarusian government lacks operational decision-making powers over its armed forces; and since the early 2000s, Belarus has in effect been incorporated within Russia’s Joint Operational Command.” Nonetheless the report went on to observe that “Belarusian and Russian forces do not train in the same integrated fashion as Nato states and officials in Moscow realise that they cannot take for granted the loyalty of all elements of the Belarusian army.” As the last sentence makes clear, the precariousness of Belarusian loyalty keeps both Russia and the West in play. Lukashenko views the relationship with Moscow as transactional, a strained marriage of convenience where there is no love lost between the two heads of state.

Lukashenko has spent most of his 26 years in power exploiting the “Eurasian shuffle”, as one commentator characterises it, the ongoing dance by a number of post-Soviet leaders “between Moscow and Washington to secure maximum advantage.” Lukashenko and others would move towards the West in search of economic aid and political support by stressing their independence from Russia, only to move back towards Moscow in order to avoid any genuine democratisation and reform.

The problem for Nato is that Lukashenko has managed to manipulate the US and the West by admitting some transgressions, whilst underscoring the country’s ability to act as a buffer against Russian expansion.

As recently as February, Mike Pompeo made the first visit by a US secretary of State since Lukashenko took power in 1994. The offer he made of the US fulfilling all of the Belarus’s oil needs was no doubt a provocation to Russia. But it was unclear whether Lukashenko was honestly trying to forge closer ties with America, or simply furthering his strategy of exerting maximum concessions by playing Russia and the West off each other. Russia’s immediate response was to stop oil exports to the country.

The week before the elections, Belarus expelled 30 Russian mercenaries from the now infamous Wagner Group. Explanations for their presence range from Belarus being a staging point en route to Libya, Syria and Sudan, where the companies’ mercenaries are used as a deniable Russian state asset, to outright interference in the Belarusian election. Belarusian media reported up to 200 Russian operatives in the country. The most plausible explanation is that Lukashenko connived with Moscow to stoke widespread fears of Russian interference, in order to bolster his support. The message was quite clear, re-elect Lukashenko or Belarus would go in the same direction as Ukraine.

Predictably for an effective dictatorship, Belarus had been stable but with Belarusian Police and Military rapidly siding with the people, Lukashenko’s grasp of power may be unsustainable. Another alternative is that his rule is only sustainable through massive coercion of the people. Given the situation it is entirely possible that Lukashenko might feel compelled to end his longstanding strategy of playing Russian and Western interests off against each other and instead accept direct Russian support.

At the time of writing, Belarus’s armed forces seem poised on a knife edge with widespread reports of both the police and military siding with protestors. This is an incredibly combustible situation. Putin has a vested interest in keeping Lukashenko in power both for strategic and political reasons. If Lukashenko goes, it demonstrates again that Moscow’s strongmen are not invulnerable. Russia cannot allow authority in Belarus to be overthrown.

This is potentially a chance for the West to act with more skilful diplomacy than it did over Ukraine in 2014. The Belarusian people do not seem to want either full Western or Russian integration. They want independence. It seems extremely unlikely that Lukashenko can survive the weight of popular discontent, without a terrible price in blood being paid. The West’s strategic interests are best served by placating Nato’s Baltic members by supporting the cause of Belarusian neutrality. While the Suwalki gap remains a key strategic issue, it is impossible to imagine that Russia would allow the Belarusian people to choose an entirely pro-Western leader.

The situation in Belarus is a sign of the times, illustrating just how far US and Western power has declined since its high point twenty years ago. Whether we like it or not, Belarus remains central to Russian strategic ambitions. At the time of writing, a column of unmarked Russian military vehicles with an estimated force of 600 men was seen advancing towards the border. Russia’s willingness to intervene militarily to support its interests in the country, either in the form of Lukashenko or another proxy, should not be underestimated. Unless a western coalition is prepared to defend Belarusian democracy with force, there are few options that don’t at least acknowledge Russia’s proximity.

The least worst option on the table is found in historical precedent. The US and Russia managed to find common cause in ensuring a “soft landing” following Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003 and there was an initial deal worked out by the EU-3 in Ukraine before events overtook it. The Georgia deal did nothing to stop further Russian interference there. The new reality is that the West will not be able to force permanent political settlement in Russia’s backyard. Western sanctions on Belarus are all but inevitable, but Nato members should also be working hard to hasten Lukashenko’s peaceful departure, even if that means ushering a Belarusian future that is equally palatable for Moscow.