Legacy of terror: the net closes on the IRA

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Legacy of terror: the net closes on the IRA

Derry, Northern Ireland IRA Ghost Graffiti City Walls Derry (Shutterstock)

Several prime suspects responsible for the spate of IRA bombings and shootings in Britain from 1974-1976 — a campaign of terror that left 52 people dead and some 800 injured — have been identified, according to legacy investigators in Belfast.

The suspects, now in their 70s and 80s, have been linked to the attacks from forensic evidence subjected to new scientific testing ordered by the Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery in Belfast.

However, the Irish Government is to face pressure to offer far greater co-operation than has happened up to now to legacy investigations into killings that took place during The Troubles.

Keith Surtees, ICRIR Deputy Commissioner for Investigations  told me: “Due to very significant advances in forensic science since these atrocities half a century ago, we have developed some highly significant leads.”

The ex-Metropolitan police commander added that there was now “the real prospect of finally bringing some of the perpetrators of 70 bombings and shootings to justice.”

Surtees was the Chief Investigator for Operation Kenova, which established the British agent codenamed Stakeknife’s involvement in 13 murders and 15 abductions of suspected fellow agents and informers.

The IRA attacks now under active re-investigation include the M62 motorway coach bombing in February 1974, when the IRA planted 25 pounds of high explosive inside the luggage locker of a coach carrying off-duty soldiers and their families.

The bomb detonated just after midnight as the westbound coach headed to Catterick army base, killing nine soldiers, three civilians and injuring 38.

The ICRIR has also been investigating the two no-warning pub bombings in Guilford, Surrey. The first device planted in the Horse and Groom pub killed four soldiers and a civilian aged between 17 and 21, five days before the October 1974 general election. The bomb is suspected of having been left by a man and women posing as a courting couple.

A second bomb exploded 30 minutes later at the Seven Stars pub which had been evacuated. The blast fractured the landlord’s skull and broke his wife’s leg as they searched the premises.

None of the perpetrators of either the M62 or Guilford has ever been identified.

Judith Ward was wrongly convicted in 1974 for the M62 bombing and released in 1992 after both her confession and forensic evidence were discredited in the Court of Appeal.

Gerry Conlon, Paul Hill, Paddy Armstrong, and Carole Richardson – known as the “Guilford Four” — were also wrongly convicted, spending 15 years in jail before their convictions were overturned.

Surtees declined to provide further details of ICRIR’s investigation into these and other attacks for “operational reasons”, but emphasised he was “confident that some of those investigations will result in arrests” as well delivering “vital information recovery findings for families”.

The construction of the bombs common to several mid 1970s attacks is believed to be one key focus of the ICRIR investigation, initiated at the request of relatives of the dead soldiers and civilians.

Under the 2023 Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act brought in by the last government, only relatives can trigger an investigation into conflict-related killings between 1966 and 1998.  The fact that they have done so against IRA perpetrators marks a distinct departure from the focus on legacy cases to date, which has been primarily on the role of the British state.

Following requests from relatives of the bereaved from IRA cross border attacks, the ICRIR is also investigating the 1979 double ambush that killed 18 British soldiers on the northern side of Carlingford Lough, from two large roadside bombs at Narrow Water Castle outside Warrenpoint, Co. Down. The “Warrenpoint ambush” was the deadliest attack on the British Army during the entire conflict.

Both bombs, half an hour apart, were initiated by radio control 200 yards across the lough on its southern bank. A British tourist was also killed on the shore in Co Lough by army gunfire.

The ambush happened five hours after Louis Mountbatten — Earl Mountbatten of Burma and uncle to the late Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh — was assassinated by an IRA bomb in his fishing boat in Mullaghmore Co. Sligo. Two family members and a 15 year old boy also died.

The ICRIR was established under the controversial 2023 Legacy Act which the Conservatives said would “draw a line” under the conflict in the hope that this would facilitate reconciliation.

Its impact has been the reverse. The Act has been nearly universally unpopular, not just with nationalist and loyalist NGOs in the North but also with some non-aligned organisations, such as the Wave Trauma Centre in Belfast that provides support to victims and survivors.

The Act closed all outstanding conflict related inquests, and it also offered an amnesty to suspects on condition that they provide accurate information. This change in the law was principally aimed at what its architect, the then British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, termed “vexatious prosecutions” of former British soldiers.

The Northern Ireland Courts have since ruled that such a conditional amnesty was incompatible with Britain’s obligation under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to conduct an effective, independent and transparent investigation into past killings involving the State.

The Act also put an end to future conflict-related civil actions and also to major investigations into unlawful agent-running by Operation Kenova and by the former Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir (now Lord) John Stevens. The courts have since struck down the ban on civil proceedings and inquests.

The Act means that the ICRIR is now the only agency permitted to investigate the several hundred unresolved conflict-related deaths, which Britain’s membership of the ECHR requires to be concluded to an Article Two standard.

The ICRIR has been the subject of strong nationalist criticism for lacking both operational independence from the State and sufficient powers to conduct effective Article 2 compliant investigations.

The present Labour Northern Ireland Secretary, Hilary Benn, has promised to “strengthen the Commission’s independence and accountability” through primary legislation, though he has yet to flesh out the details.

The ICRIR has not released specific details of how many of its investigators once served in the Royal Ulster Constabulary, but is believed to be relatively small. A sizeable majority are ex-members of Operation Kenova who originated from English constabularies. Nevertheless, nationalists say any ex-RUC involvement taints perceptions.

The ICRIR Chief Commissioner, Sir Declan Morgan, a former Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, has pointed out that senior ex-IRA members on the Northern Ireland Policing Board currently choose PSNI Chief Constables. “Inclusion and rights are key to reconciliation and progress”, he says.

Whitehall officials accept privately that there exists an independence perception problem in some communities, but say “that it can be addressed”. They point out that “it’s not been raised by 220-plus individuals already with the Commission from every background”.

The Commission has proposed amending the Legacy Act to include a statutory firewall ensuring that there is no conflict of interest, either perceptively or in practice. In reality that would mean non-RUC officers would be operationally responsible for conducting most criminal legacy investigations in future.

Instead, ex-RUC officers could undertake the ICRIR’s other role in recovering information from files about a death for relatives who seek it. Or they could help to retrieve information from former members of armed groups who might offer it — an idea that was part of previous legacy proposals.

Senior Whitehall sources have also acknowledged that the ICRIR’s critics have a valid concern about the Commission’s inability to consistently conduct effective Article Two compliant investigations, as the Court of Appeal in Belfast has confirmed in its judgment in a specific case.

This is one of the issues over which the Irish government is currently taking the British government to the European Court of Human Rights. The Act gives ICRIR investigators fewer powers than a police force, and in some cases fewer powers even than local authorities.

This includes the absence of powers under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) to direct surveillance against a suspect – unlike councils for licensing enforcement.

Nor does the Commission have authority to retrieve billing data from telephone companies, or to force a suspect to provide a DNA sample.

In circumstances where the ICRIR currently has over 90 live investigations into 157 overall deaths, it has fewer powers but more homicides to deal with than the Metropolitan Police. The challenge to Benn is whether he will give ICRIR the powers, investigators and resources that it needs.

“There is a need for significant reform,” acknowledged one Whitehall official, “both for confidence building and as a matter of sheer practicality.” It is understood a much favoured option would involve building on the Kenova-type investigation model, in parallel with an arm focused on information recovery.

Kenova succeeded in finding new and important information about the agent Stakeknife’s criminality by finally securing access to files from MI5 and from discovering a secret MoD computer system whose log-in was inaccessible to previous outside inquiries into the intelligence services.

The Kenova model has also been endorsed by families, stakeholders and veterans’ groups as being ECHR compliant and victim-focused. Several families who have recently received draft Kenova reports have commended Kenova for the detail they provide.

I understand the Commission has been pushing Benn to equip the ICRIR with RIPA equivalent powers, the right to initiate certain types of investigations, and for the PSNI to refer to the Commission legacy case leads they encounter.

Officials also want Benn to explore allowing independent judges, under the Commission, to conduct the equivalent of inquest hearings yet to be heard with next of kin representation.

The single most enduring impediment to confidence building within the Legacy Act has been the Secretary of State’s veto over the disclosure of what the Act refers to as “sensitive information”, typically the role of State agents, on the grounds that its release would pose a threat to national security.

The UK Supreme Court is currently considering an appeal by Benn to retain the veto over what constitutes a threat to national security, instead of the PSNI Chief Constable exercising his discretion over intelligence held by him.

If the court finds in Benn’s favour, that will likely be the end of the matter, because it will be settled UK law. However, the ICRIR is seeking to mitigate the Secretary of State’s veto by urging Benn to allow ICRIR the right of appeal over national security non-disclosure decisions by him.

The ICRIR also wants the Irish government to strengthen North-South co-operation on its investigations into unresolved cross border attacks, including Warrenpoint, by establishing discreet An Garda Siochana and Judicial liaison mechanisms to expedite requests for evidence and information. Kenova’s experience on this front was not encouraging. “If you want to fully investigate cases like Narrow Water, a joint framework with the Irish government is needed,” one official said.

The next three months will see a series of critical decisions over whether the British and Irish governments can agree a viable joint framework on reforms to replace the Legacy Act, legislation which will also need to take account of three key Supreme Court rulings.

The outcome will determine the shape, content, powers and long-term effectiveness of the Commission and by extension the scope for meaningful reconciliation, after a quarter of a century of failed legacy initiatives.

John Ware has covered the Northern Ireland conflict  since 1974 and its legacy since the signing of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. His book on the role of the intelligence service in the conflict, Neither Confirm Nor Deny, is due for publication in the Spring of 2026.

 

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